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Abstract. Property reparation programs undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe after 
the fall of the communist regimes fail to fulfill ‘the promises of the rule of law’. Reparation 
schemes do not have an exclusively reparative nature, moreover, reparation was deliberately 
linked with structural reform, and due to this duality, the scheme features a mixed distributive-
reparative character. This resulted in two troublesome aspects: on one hand, there is no evidence 
of a compelling argument, which justifies the mitigation of past property deprivations at 
large. On the other hand, it can not be satisfactorily demonstrated why property-related 
injustices enjoy a privileged status when it comes to reparations, in comparison to other 
types of losses. Further, bearing in mind the Hayekian objection towards distributive justice, 
even those who had been placed in an equal situation–i.e. all suffered past property injustices–
are not offered an objectively equal opportunity to claim redress. Due to the fact that the 
schemes addressed reparations–at least in part–from a distributive perspective (which resulted 
in an attempt to create a substantive equality between victims), the result that they achieved 
was objective inequality, as everyone was entitled to reparation between the same limitations, 
while everyone suffered losses of different extent. These differences in treatment between 
various former owners are mostly arbitrary, and in certain cases deliberately introduced so as 
to produce inequalities, and thereby meet the Hayekian concerns as far as they produce 
results that conflict with the idea of the rule of law. The analyzed provisions of the reparation 
schemes lead in practice to the creation of winners and losers of reparations, to a breach of the 
idea of formal equality before the law. In the conditions in which reparation schemes fall short 
from a thick conception of the rule of law (justice, rights or objective equality) it worth 
investigating, whether requirements of a thin reading–focusing on foreseability, clarity and 
consistency–are still met by post-communist property redistribution. Unfortunately at least 
under three aspects–valuation, time limits and probation–the reparation schemes’ provisions 
are not beyond criticism. The complexity of tasks that transition societies had to face is 
obvious and uncontested. Transitional law, according to Teitel, is a sui generis paradigm, a 
vehicle of social, political and ideological transformation. The amendments to the rule of 
law ideal, justifiable in the context of transition can go as far as–for example–to allow 
governments to decide upon the concrete form of the reparation, the type of wrongs it want 
to address, the period in time intended to be covered. But they may not create winners and 
losers; they may not distinguish between those placed in the same situation. 
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This paper analyzes the property reparation programs of post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe from the perspective of the rule of law. It’s central argument 
is that ultimately these schemes fall short from fulfilling what Skapska stylishly 
calls “promises of the rule of law.”1 Writing about the essence of the rule of 
law, Raz notes that law should be able to actually guide human conduct.2 This 
view is nicely completed by Teitel, who argues that in periods of political 
upheaval, the rule of law serves to mediate the normative shift in justice. For 
natural lawyers, continues Teitel, the predecessor regime’s immorality determines 
the necessity for a “fresh start”, for the rule of law to be grounded in some-
thing else than adherence to the preexisting law.3   
 The commitment to processes that “allow property rights to be secure under 
legal rules that will be applied predictably [...] is the essence of the rule of 
law”–tells us Cass.4 The question that arises than is: were reparation laws 
“good laws”? One must note that modern theories of the rule of law deny its 
moral features. Raz and Rawls speak about a legally good system, instead of a 
morally good one. Neumann adds that rational people need a predictable, not a 
fair system: “[w]e know that life is not fair and we plan our lives accordingly ... 
it matters not at all whether this unfairness is found inside or outside the 
courtroom, so long as it is predictable.”5 Moreover, law is essentially good, 
because there are good reasons to have law and be governed by it–adds 
Marmor.6 At most, it might be argued that the rule of law–although representing 
basically functional values–also promotes additional goods (beyond func-
tionality), such as impartiality, transparency etc., and these contribute to the 
popularity of the rule of law ideal.7 
 Unfortunately, post-communist reparation schemes are problematic exactly 
under the above-mentioned features, which are thought to be essential for the 
rule of law ideal. The argument starts with the idea that property reparation 
schemes do not have an exclusively reparative nature, moreover, reparation 
was deliberately linked with structural reform, and due to this duality, the 
scheme features a mixed distributive-reparative character. This, however, 
  
 1 Skąpska, G.: Restitutive Justice, Rule of Law, and Constitutional Dilemmas. In: 
Czarnota–Krygier–Sadurski (eds.): Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism. Budapest, 
2005. 215. 
 2 Raz, J: The Authority of Law. Oxford, 1977. 211–212. 
 3 Teitel, R. G.: Transitional Justice. Oxford, c. 2000. 11–27. 
 4 Cass, R. A.: Property rights systems and the rule of law. http://ssrn.com/abstract_ 
id=392783, 2. 
 5 Neumann, M.: The rule of law: politicizing ethics. Burlington, VT, 2002. 45. 
 6 Marmor, A.: The rule of law and its limits. http://ssrn.com/abstract=424613, 53. 
 7 Ibid. 10. 
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represents a real problem for the rule of law, as, according to Hayek’s remark: 
“any policy aiming directly at a substantive ideal of distributive justice must 
lead to the destruction of the Rule of Law.” According to Hayek, the rule of law 
is inherently leading to economic inequalities, but this inequality is acceptable, 
until it is not deliberately produced, and until it consists in the differentiated 
treatment of the different persons, i.e. objective equality of opportunities is 
preferred to a subjective equality.8 
 Building on this finding, one of the essential requirements that reparation 
schemes have to live up consists in offering objectively equal opportunities to 
those placed in an equal situation. However, the various limitations that are 
placed on reparations (person-related, temporal, quantitative and property-
based) betray concerns towards substantive equality, which in practice resulted 
in unjustified inequalities, producing arbitrary outcomes. 
 But even if one endorses a minimalist reading of the rule of law, proposed 
by Raz, according to which it needs not to produce just outcomes,9 and accepts 
the functionalist view, which expects not more and not less than (reparation) 
laws to be predictable, coherent and consistent, may find that post-communist 
schemes fall short in some aspects (quantification, deadlines, evidence) from 
the requirements of a thin version of the rule of law too.   
 Before addressing the issue of limited reparations, the justness of the entire 
scheme has to be assessed. Starting from Raz’s argument, according to which 
justice is an ideal distinct from the rule of law, completed with Radbruch’s 
view of the relationship between these two ideals as an antinomy between two 
essential elements of legality,10 it seems that this contrast is most difficult to 
deal with in regime change contexts.  
 One compromising attempt is represented by Teitel’s argument, which 
maintains that in transitions, law’s role itself is transitional and not founda-
tional. Transitional jurisprudence’s task is to bridge conventional legality and 
radical transformation. Which values prevail in this conflict–argues the author–
are ultimately determined by particular historical and political legacies.11 To 
these factors the–economical and political–interests of the emerging new elite 
can be added, even accepting the amendment that present interests are to some 
extent contingent upon the legacies of the past.  
  
 8 Hayek, F.: The Road to Serfdom. University of Chicago Press, c1991. 59. 
 9 Raz, J.: Rule of Law and Its Virtue. In: Cunningham (ed.): Liberty and the Rule of 
Law. Texas, 1979. 4. 
 10 Radbruch, G.: Rechtsphilosophie. Heidelberg, 1987. 
 11 Teitel: op. cit. 215.  
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 More importantly, however, it can be argued, that while the above-enumerated 
elements determine the prevailing values of transition, the appropriateness of 
the choice is function of the effectiveness of the chosen value in fulfilling the 
envisaged objectives. In other words: if radical transformation is the order of 
the day, and all this is done in the name of justice, the outcome of the process 
should be demonstrably just. Otherwise, lofty principles of justice will serve 
only as facades to arbitrariness. But property reparation schemes feature two 
troublesome aspects from this point of view. On one hand, there is no evidence 
of a compelling argument, which justifies the mitigation of past property de-
privations at large. On the other hand, it can not be satisfactorily demonstrated 
why property-related injustices enjoy a privileged status when it comes to 
reparations, in comparison to other types of losses. 
 The linking of property reparations with reforms resulted in two broad and 
distinct goals that were expected to be realized through reparations. On one 
hand, to compensate individuals for the property losses they suffered as a 
consequence of unjust governmental actions. On the other, to resettle property 
relationships so as to achieve certainty in possessions which was regarded as a 
precondition for the creation of an efficient market economy. The processes 
were generally envisaged as being guided by the principles of the rule of law.  
 Such is the case of Hungary, where property compensation had a declared 
social goal. Or, in Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal identified “a beneficial 
social aspect” of the compensation scheme dealing with the properties left 
beyond the Bug River.12 Similar conclusion was reached by the Estonian Supreme 
Court,13 arguing that “ownership reform was undertaken in public that is in 
general interests. Ownership reform is a specific task of the state in building up 
a rule of law state and a market economy.” The Lithuanian Constitutional 
Court has managed to find some social goals in reparations too, arguing that 
“[t]he restoration of the rights to land has actually meant process of agrarian 
reform. […] The restoration of the rights of ownership and land reform are 
inseparable processes. The restoration of the rights to land was the basic means 
for implementing of land reform.”14  
 Contrary views have been voiced, for example, by the Czech15 and the 
Latvian16 courts, which both held that the goal of restitution laws is (reparative) 
  
 12 K 2/04. Judgment of 15th December 2004, concerning the right to offset the value of 
property left in the former Eastern territories of Poland. 
 13 Decision 3-4-1-10-2000, of 22 December 2000. 
 14 On restoration of citizens’ ownership rights to land, decision of 8 March 1995.  
 15 I. US 38/02, judgement of 24 March 2004. 
 16 Case No. 04-01(99), judgement of April 20, 1999.  
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justice, i.e. the rectification of past wrongs, without mentioning any related 
social aims. This statement of the Constitutional Court is especially interesting 
in the case of the Czech Republic, where commentators identified, at least at the 
moment of the adoption, additional purposes of reparations, alike those that 
were mentioned above. According to Cepl for instance, the new political elite 
considered restitution as helpful means in speeding up privatization and 
developing market economy.17 However, it seems that by 2004 the Court 
managed to find a narrower ratio legis behind the restitution scheme.  
 According to Stephen Holmes, the economic rationale could fail out of 
consideration of efficiency: record-keeping was poor under communist admini-
stration, the judiciary is under-sized and under-educated, and promises to 
restore property in kind creates serious uncertainty in possessions.18 Fact is 
that, for example, the Romanian restitution process generated about 1 million 
lawsuits19 and as of 2007, the process has not been terminated. Albeit, argues 
Holmes, “even if restitution is both economically inefficient and morally unjust, it 
is good policy,”20 because it helps legitimating the new property system, by 
preventing the former communist elite from appropriating (all) state assets. 
“Good policy,” however, does hardly further the case of the rule of law.  
 Undoubtedly, by adding additional aims to property reparations, as land 
reform, establishing the preconditions of a market economy etc. a strong 
distributive aspect of reparations is created. Kutz notes, for instance, that because 
on one hand communist takings of property were generally maintaining a 
semblance of legitimacy, and on the other hand the communist regimes are ‘off 
the stage’, post-communist reparations are pushed towards a more distributive 
approach to compensation.21  
 The UN Human Rights Committee has stressed in the case of Somers v. 
Hungary, that objective compensation criteria of compensation have to be 
applied equally and without discrimination.22 Patrick Macklem considers that 
  
 17 Cepl, V.: A note on the restitution of property in post-communist Czechoslovakia. 
(7) Journal of Communist Studies 367, 1991, also quoted by Crowder, R. W.: Restitution in 
the Czech Republic: Problems and Prague-Nosis, (5) Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review, 237. 
 18 Holmes, Stephen in A Forum on Restitution: Essays on the Efficiency and Justice of 
Returning Property to Its Former Owners. East European Constitutional Review, 1993. 32. 
 19 Verdery, K.: The Vanishing Hectare: property and value in postsocialist Transylvania. 
Ithaca, N.Y. 2003. 46. 
 20 Holmes: op. cit. 33. 
 21 Kutz, Ch.: Justice in Reparations: The Cost of Memory and the Value of Talk. (32) 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2004. 298. 
 22 CCPR/C/57D/566/1993, Decision of 29 July 1996, para. 9.4. 
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this language is urging governments entertaining compensatory schemes to 
pay close attention to the demands of distributive justice.23 The Hungarian 
Constitution Court recognized this a couple of years earlier, when it argued 
that the constitutionality of the compensation law has to be assessed on the 
basis of distributive justice, taking into consideration not merely the interests 
of the victims, but also the concurrent constitutional tasks.24 
 Turning to the two troublesome aspects mentioned above, the first funda-
mental question that needs an answer is whether communist takings of property 
demand reparations or not? Undoubtedly, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights creates a right to effective remedy for acts violating fundamental 
rights guaranteed by constitution or by law.25 A similar provision is reiterated 
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.26 Commentators 
note, however, that the scope and content of the right to redress is fuzzy and 
unclear, and it does not necessarily create an obligation to compensate every 
type of violation. Although a right to compensation is consistently recognized for 
victims of serious violations (such as torture, forced disappearance, extra-legal 
executions etc.).27 
 In addition, even if the major international documents, such as the Universal 
Declaration,28 a protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights29 or the 
European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights30 mention the right to property, 
none of them recognizes a right to restitution.  
 In the case of Somers v. Hungary, the UN Human Rights Committee held 
that the Covenant did not protect the right to property, and therefore “there is 
no right, as such, to have (expropriated or nationalized) property restituted.” 
On the other hand, the Committee also noted, that the Covenant itself entered 
into force with respect to Hungary in 1976, and therefore the Hungarian state 
  
 23 Macklem, P.: 1 Rybná 9 Praha 1: Restitution and Memory in International Human 
Rights Law. (16) European Journal of International Law, 2005. 10–1l. 
 24 HCC, AB 15/1993, 1543/B/1991. 
 25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly 
resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
 26 Art. 2 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G. A. res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 27 Orentlicher, D. F.: Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and Victim 
Compensation. In: Henkin and Hargrove (eds.): Human Rights: An agenda for the next 
century. American Society of International Law, 1994. 449. 
 28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. op. cit. art 17. 
 29 European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 1 Enforcement of certain Rights 
and Freedoms not included in Section I of the Convention of 20 March 1952, art. 1.  
 30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01, art 17.  
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may not be held responsible under its provisions for facts that occurred before 
that date. A similar conclusion was reached by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania, where the Strasbourg court refused 
to examine the nationalization of the claimant’s land, on account of ratione 
temporis lack of competence.31 At the same time, the Court stated that the 
Convention does not guarantee the right to restitution of property. This argument 
was repeated also in Rucińska,32 and refined in Broniowski.33 Neither the hope 
that long extinguished property rights may be revived, nor a conditional claim 
which has lapsed as a result of failure to fulfill the condition, can be regarded 
as ‘possession’, in the meaning of the Convention and its Protocol No.1. Albeit 
even if there is no clear-cut standard for property restitution in international 
law, the obligation of successor regimes to repair the wrong done by their 
predecessor is unequivocally formulated.34 Moreover, it may also be invoked 
that general principles of international law also assert the requirement of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the expropriation of property. 
But in James and others, the European Court of Human Rights pointed out that 
the principles in question apply exclusively to non-nationals, thus they do not 
govern the treatment accorded by the states to their own citizens.35 
 Symmetrically, most contemporary constitutions enumerate property among 
the protected rights, albeit merely takings, and not restitution are constitutionally 
regulated. At a domestic level, however, things are even more complicated, and 
reparation efforts face serious dilemmas related to the retrospective/prospective 
or individual/collective dimensions of reparations.36  
 Kutz argues that “expropriation on its own is not a categorical wrong like 
murder or political repression; it does not by its very nature vault to the head 
of the line for repair.”37 Posner and Vermeule, argue that property is always 
uncertain in domestic law, due to the government’s freedom to regulate that 
property at any time. However, add the authors, such unsettling of property 
  
 31 Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania, Application no. 41510/98, Judgement of 6 March 2003, para. 38. 
 32 Rucińska v. Poland, European Court of Human Right, Application no. 33752/96, 
Decision of 27 January 2000. 
 33 Broniowski v. Poland, ECHR, Application no. 31443/96, Judgement of 22 June 
2004, para. 182: Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 “does not guarantee a right to full compensation 
in all circumstances.” 
 34 Meron, Th.: Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. Gloncestershire, 
1991. 171.  
 35 James and Others v. United Kingdom, Application no. 3/1984/75/119, Judgement of 
22 January 1986, para. 58–65. 
 36 Teitel: op. cit. 119. 
 37 Kutz: op. cit. 285. 
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rights is tolerated, if it promotes a pressing social goal and its achievement 
does not significantly undermine the market.38 Of course, this reasoning applies 
within the framework of a market economy. Still, a Hungarian Constitutional 
Court opinion cited in the foregoing paragraphs of this chapter, managed to 
declare some of the nationalization decrees as unconstitutional, exactly because 
their goal could not be defended on the basis of social need, while their finality 
was the liquidation of an entire property class.39 (A quite contrary view was 
voiced by the Romanian Supreme Court, which held that the manner in which 
nationalization decrees have been applied could not be reviewed by the 
courts.40) The Hungarian Court’s arguments back Sadurski’s critique41 of Posner 
and Vermeule: communist takings were not promoting a pressing social goal, 
and they did significantly undermine the market (by basically terminating it), 
thus they fundamentally differ from ‘normal’ takings, accordingly the tasks for 
the post-communist governments in handling past legacies were fundamentally 
different too. 
 As it was already hinted at in the foregoing passages, the legality of 
communist takings is controversial too. In many cases, the nationalization and 
confiscation failed to comply with the then existing legal requirements. But 
while legal takings are difficult to challenge, there is a much stronger case against 
illegal (or de facto) takings. One example of holding communist nationalization 
decrees unconstitutional is the above–cited example of the Hungarian Consti-
tutional Court. Failure to comply with obligations assumed through international 
conventions is another example in this sense: the above described cases of 
the properties left over the Bug River, and the Hungarian-Czechoslovakian 
population exchange agreement illustrate the problem. Another good example 
in this sense is Decree no. 52 of 1950 issued by the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of Romania, which led to the nationalization of a large number of 
houses and apartments. The decree disregarded constitutional guarantees, as 
it provided that the expropriated goods are transferred to the state without 
  
 38 Posner, E. A.–Vermeule, A.: Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 
(103) Columbia Law Review, 2003. 68. 
 39 HCC, AB 27/1991, 91/E/1990, supra. 
 40 For further details: Brumarescu v. Romania, ECHR, Application no. 28342/95, 
Judgement of 28 October 1999, para. 15–20. 
 41 Sadurski, W. S.: “Decommunisation”. “Lustration”, and Constitutional Continuity: 
Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Central Europe. Florence, EUI Working Paper Law, 
2003. 15. 
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any compensation.42 The Lithuanian Constitutional Court has found that the 
“nationalization and other unlawful socialization of property” was started by 
the occupation government (i.e. Soviet Union). Therefore, even if the post-
communist government cannot be held responsible for the actions of the 
occupying forces, steps had to be taken towards the restoration of rights of 
people which had been violated.43  
 Thus, under those circumstances in which the illegality of the takings can 
be demonstrated, there are strong reasons to recognize the ‘survival’ of former 
property rights, even if the state withholds the discretion to decide upon the 
concrete form of the compensation which may be granted in these cases. A 
category of exceptional cases is represented by the situations in which the state 
assumed an obligation (to compensate property losses) which was never ful-
filled. In these situations, the right to compensation should be recognized as 
flowing from the state’s lack of compliance–as the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court put it: constitutional omission44–rather than made function of an ex gratia 
allotment. The major problem with ex gratia reparation is that governmental 
benevolence does not equate with justice. Official magnanimity does neither 
presume (recognize) the existence of entitlement, nor of any governmental 
obligation towards their holders. Such compensation, alike presidential pardon, 
is rather about those who exercise the discretion, than those who benefit from 
it. This constitutes one of the main controversies of the Hungarian compensa-
tion law (no. XXV of 1991): the preamble speaks about the principles of the 
rule of law and the society’s sense of justice, but at the end of the day, the 
entire scheme is made a function of state generosity.45   
 Critiques of the ex gratia approach to reparations have pointed it out that 
even acts of grace have to conform to constitutional requirements, and for 
instance should not affect the fulfillment of the state’s constitutional, inter-
national or previously assumed legal obligations. According to this view, even the 
sequential approach to reparation (the periodicity of regulation, as opposed 
to the periodicity of execution) may appear problematic. Finally, it must be 
noted that magnanimity is classically regarded as a measure destined to 
  
 42 The Constitution of 1948, art. 10 provided that expropriations can be effected only 
for a public utility, through law and upon the payment of just compensation established by 
the judiciary.  
 43 LiCC, Ruling of 27 May 1994, and Ruling of 20 June 1995.  
 44 HCC, AB 16/1993, 1378/E/1990; AB 37/1996, 837/E/1995; AB 45/2003, 960/B/19995. 
 45 HCC, AB 21/1990, 1057/G/1990.  
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attenuate the consequences of the application of harsh laws, and not as a 
lawmaking principle.46 
 A peculiar case is the one of those who lost property as a consequence of their 
opposition to the regime, as an accessory punishment to criminal convictions. In 
many post-communist states, laws for the rehabilitation of those subjected to 
repression for political reasons were enacted. Rehabilitation also created the 
possibility to claim compensation for the property losses suffered. 
 Interestingly, the Venice Commission, in its Opinion on the Albanian Draft 
Law on Recognition, Restitution and Compensation of Property, considered 
that the “practicable solution” would be that instead of the recognition of original, 
pre-expropriation ownership, the compensation acts should create the title for 
regaining property.47 In this regard, it worth noting the arguments of the 
Romanian Constitutional Court as to the contrary. The Court emphasized that 
in the case of properties, which were transferred into the state’s possession 
through an unlawful act, or without any legal basis, the individual’s legal right 
has never been extinguished. This means that symmetrically, the state has no 
ownership rights, and therefore these properties cannot be covered by the same 
acts, which regulate the legal status of property that passed into state owner-
ship. To hold otherwise, would either confer a retroactive effect on such a norm, 
or create a form of taking unknown to the constitution.48  
 The second troublesome question that reparation schemes face is why do 
only certain wrongs committed under the preceding regime deserve compensa-
tion? In other words, what makes the difference between various past wrongs 
that justifies reparation? There are three possible justifications worthy of 
discussion: the recognition and protection of rights, the idea of past harm, and 
the principle of political persecution.49  
 In post-communist context it is rather difficult to ground property reparation 
on the idea of rights. The communist regimes that effected the takings made 
use of their legal powers to do so, except for the cases where takings took place 
under military occupation, in breach of the existing legal provisions governing 
expropriation, or the state simply failed to fulfill its obligations regarding 
compensations. Thus, as Teitel observes, “[p]roperty rights entitlements arising 
  
 46 Sajó, A.: A részleges kárpótlási törvény által felvetett alkotmányossági kérdések [On 
the constitutional problems raised by the partial compensation bill]. (34) Állam és Jogtudo-
mány, 1992. 200–201. and 220. 
 47 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Opinion no. 277/2004, CDL-
AD (2004) 009, para. 9.  
 48 RCC, Decision no. 73 of 19 July 1995. 
 49 Teitel: op. cit. 132–134. 
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out of past wrongs are constructed ex post and are, simultaneously self-referential 
and justificatory of present property distributions.”50 But, the right to property 
is neither the sole, nor the paramount fundamental right recognized by post-
communist constitutions. 
 The principle of past harm, as a normative value, does not offer enough 
guidance in justifying property reparations, at least in the post-communist 
context. And that because it simply sweeps too broad. As Elster remarked, 
“essentially everybody suffered under communism”.51 Some were imprisoned, 
placed under secret surveillance, had their books placed on index, barred from 
leaving the country or many simply lost career opportunities or suffered other 
losses. István Pogány noted that “the economic consequences of expelling 
Jews from certain sectors of employment […] was at least as severe, for the 
individuals concerned and for their families, as the confiscation of property 
proved for others.” The obvious result, to which the principle of past harm has 
to lead therefore, is universal and equivalent reparations. 
 Therefore, the third justification, namely political persecution (discrimination) 
needs to be brought into play. The above-mentioned Hungarian Constitutional 
Court decision did also relay on the discriminating feature of past takings, 
while attempting to demonstrate their lack of compliance with constitutionally 
protected values. The argument of the Court maintained that the notion of 
public utility does not extend to takings that stigmatize or discriminate against 
individuals or groups.52 The nationalization process initially was targeting the 
assets of a certain class, later properties of a certain size, and finally the near 
complete annihilation of the institution of private property.  
 Discriminative taking, as a ground for reparation appears perhaps most 
obvious in the case of Holocaust restitution. In Hungary, after the fall of the 
right-wing regime, an impressive number of decrees issued between 1945 and 
1947 provided for the return of immovable and movable goods–especially those 
pertaining to small businesses–and regulating the faith of heirless properties.53 
In post-war Czechoslovakia, Decree no. 5 annulled all transactions that occurred 
on the basis of racial or political persecution under the German Reich beginning 
with 29 September 1938. This was soon reconfirmed by Law no. 128 of 1946. 
Of course, Holocaust reparations take place in an entirely different context: 
  
 50 Ibid. 133. 
 51 Elster, J.: On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist Restitu-
tion and Retribution. (1) East European Constitutional Review, 1992. 16. 
 52 Pogány, I.: Righting Wrongs in Eastern Europe. Manchester, 1997. 171.  
 53 Prime Minister’s Orders no. 7590/1945, 3630/1945, 10.480/1945, 300/1946, 
12.530/1946, 6400/1947, 5280/1947, and Governmental Decree no. 13.160/1947. 
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confiscation of Jewish assets was part of a genocidal program, which makes 
these claims more compelling.54  
 A paradoxical counter-example is represented by the Czech Constitutional 
Court’s decision upon a challenge was targeting the decree on the Confiscation 
of Enemy Property and the Funds of National Renewal.55 The act in question 
identified as enemies of the nation persons of German and Hungarian nationality, 
with the scope of subjecting them to property confiscation. The presumption of 
enmity was refutable if these persons could demonstrate their loyalty to the 
Czechoslovak Republic. As the Court pointed out, the decree was based on 
a presumption of responsibility of the German and Hungarian minorities. 
However, the Court did not found any discriminatory feature in the decree 
under scrutiny, arguing that the presumption of responsibility is a ‘just sanction’, 
a ‘proportionate response’ to the Nazi aggression, and not a nationalistic 
revenge.56 The question of the “Beneš decrees” was raised at international level 
in front of the UN Human Rights Committee by a complaint against Slovakia.57 
Here the applicant alleged that the restitution scheme was discriminatory because 
it left uncompensated the victims of the 1945 seizures. The Committee, however, 
found that the scheme does not appear “prima facie” discriminatory, simply 
because it deals with victims of communism, but ignores the victims of injustices 
committed by earlier regimes. For these reasons, the complaint was declared 
inadmissible. 
 In any case, the criterion of persecution does not give a satisfactory 
explanation that may justify property reparations. True enough, it helps drafting 
the pool of beneficiaries by distinguishing those persecuted–the confiscation 
of dissident’s assets is the paradigm–from all the others who may also have 
suffered some property losses. Still, not only property owners were persecuted 
under communist regimes, and from a moral perspective, for example persecution 
that took the form of imprisonment, can not be considered to be less worthy of 
compensation than confiscation.58  
 
  
 54 Kutz: op. cit. 285. 
 55 Decree No. 108/1945 Sb. 
 56 CCC, Pl. US 14/94. 15–19. 
 57 Peter Drobek, v. Slovakia, Communication No. 643/1995 (31 May 1994), CCPR/C/ 
60/D/643/1995. 
 58 As Offe and Bönker, argue, “it would be morally wrong to let the choice of 
rectificatory strategies be distorted by the morally irrelevant fact that property can be given 
back, while years lost in prison cannot.” Offe and Bönker in: A Forum on Restitution: 
Essays on the Efficiency and Justice of Returning Property to Its Former Owners, East 
European Constitutional Review, 1993. 31. 
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Further, bearing in mind the Hayekian objection towards distributive justice, this 
paper argues that even those who had been placed in an equal situation–i.e. all 
suffered past property injustices–are not offered an objectively equal opportunity 
to claim redress. Due to the fact that the schemes addressed reparations–at 
least in part–from a distributive perspective (which resulted in an attempt to 
create a substantive equality between victims), the result that they achieved 
was objective inequality, as everyone was entitled to reparations between the 
same limitations, while everyone suffered losses of different extent.  
 There are four main aspects under which the limitations placed upon 
reparations betray egalitarian attempts, while in practice they result exclusion: 
person-related limitations (citizenship and residence), quantitative (caps), 
temporal (cut-off dates), and finally property-based (distinctive treatment 
according to the nature of the lost property: movable or immovable, various 
immovable, commercial, religious and communal). These differences in treatment 
between various former owners are mostly arbitrary, and in certain cases 
deliberately introduced so as to produce inequalities, and thereby meet the 
Hayekian concerns as far as they produce results that conflict with the idea of 
the rule of law. The analyzed provisions of the reparation schemes lead in 
practice to the creation of winners and losers of reparations, to a breach of the 
idea of formal equality before the law. 
 The most common person-related limitation on reparation is the one that 
requires for the victims to possess the citizenship and/or to be resident of the 
state against which they are willing to vindicate their claim to reparation. These 
requirements were set in order to exclude certain ‘undesirable’ individuals, 
who left the country during or even prior to the communist takeover. This is 
the case of the former, pre-communist elite and of the dissidents, and in many 
cases also of certain ethnic groups, like Sudeten Germans and Hungarians 
(expelled from post-war Czechoslovakia), Russians in the Baltic States, and 
Jews in several cases.59  
 
Under what I call ‘strict regimes’, both of the above conditions were–at 
least originally–contemplated by the restitution or compensation schemes, in 
certain cases a subsequent easement was brought by the courts. Lithuania, 
Czechoslovakia and subsequently Slovakia managed to stick to the harsh rule, 
while in the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland the residence condition 
was considered as unconstitutional and eliminated by the constitutional 
courts. ‘Milder regimes’ established only one–or, both, but alternatively–of 
  
 59 Avineri, Sh. in: A Forum on Restitution: Essays on the Efficiency and Justice of 
Returning Property to Its Former Owners. (2) East European Constitutional Review, 1993. 
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the two criteria. Accordingly, further distinctions may be made depending 
whether a policy fashioned exclusively the citizenship condition–which is 
obviously harsher, as it excludes those who lost their citizenship in the 
meantime–or it accepted also residence as an alternative–obviously milder, 
as it accommodates also returning expatriates. In this section fall the two 
other Baltic States, Hungary and Romania. The German solution constitutes 
an exception, as Property Act60 did not envisage any residence or 
citizenship related restriction on the potential circle of beneficiaries. The 
initial approach excluded, however from restitution properties taken during 
the Soviet occupation. 
 
 Turning to the issue of quantitative limitations, it can be said that repara-
tion programs differed significantly under this aspect. In the case of Hungary 
and Poland, original properties were not returned–except for certain religious 
assets,–merely a partial compensation in form of vouchers, or the possibility to 
offset the value of the taken property against new acquisitions was offered 
instead. In the other analyzed countries actual restitution–of the originally taken 
or in kind–was contemplated, but to different extent: almost all programs 
included an upper limit on the reparations that could have been received by 
individual claimants. The question of ceilings is problematic, because instead 
of giving each individual an equal objective opportunity, it gives an equal 
subjective possibility to receive compensation within general and equal limits. 
This treatment goes categorically against the rule of law, according to the 
above-cited passages from Hayek, as they deliberately produce inequality. 
What is problematic here is the fact, that these schemes under the guise of 
equality result in fact in exactly its opposite, as they create an opportunity to 
full compensation for small holders, while former owners of larger estates 
necessary receive only a partial redress. 
 The third type of limitations that were imposed by all reparation programs 
were related to the cut-off date, i.e. the point in past, which marks the 
beginning of the period of time that the scheme was meant to cover. As these 
programs were–at least partially–intended to rectify past injustices, they 
naturally had to have some definition of this ‘past’.  However, even if seemingly 
objective in its character, the cut-off dates could have been manipulated in 
such a way so as to discriminate between the victims, and to favor certain groups 
over another. In post-communist context the various reparation schemes came 
up with different solutions as to the setting of a cut-off date. Ranging from the 
Polish case, in which, due to its exceptional character of compensating only a 
  
 60 Gesetz über Regelung offener Vermögensfragen of 23 September 1990. 
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rather small category of victims, the cut-off date problem does not exist, as 
such, to the German approach, which logically and unequivocally rolled back 
the baseline so as to cover both Nazi and communist era takings, the policies 
fancy diverging cut-off dates. The Baltic States and Germany represent a fairly 
unproblematic category from this perspective, as their reparation programs were 
drafted in such a way so as to include from the outset both Nazi and 
communist era takings.  
 Setting a timeframe for reparation law’s applicability was an objective 
necessity: the legislators had to decide how far they intend to reach back 
into the past for rectifying former property injustices. Obviously, the history 
of property injustices can not be restricted to Nazi and communist takings. 
Rectification programs may attempt to deal with wrongs older than a century: 
the post-colonial examples of Native Indian, Aborigine and Maori claims 
constitute the relevant paradigm. Of course, to design such a scheme it does 
not take merely a willing government, but also a significant popular demand in 
this respect. The relative success of the above-mentioned examples is largely do 
to the existence of well-organized and goal-oriented organization of former 
owners, with a significant enough political weight to exert a sufficient pressure 
on the government.61 For example, Verdery notes about post-communist Russia, 
that restitution is impossible because collectivization took place much earlier 
than in the rest of the communist countries, while the preexisting private 
ownership structures were extremely unstable.62 Accordingly, the absence of a 
comprehensive reparation scheme is partly do to the lack of surviving victims. 
This lack of such survivors can be covered by organizations, as in the case of 
the indigenous claims, or, more closer to Europe, the various Jewish organi-
zations (arguably the most successful of them being the Claims Conference), 
that sustained with relative success claims for heirless properties. Being an 
essential element of any reparation program, the cut-off date is, in the same 
time, a handy tool of exclusion: through the setting of such baselines certain 
groups of victims can be distinguished and excluded from the benefits of the 
scheme.  
 As to what concerns property-based distinctions, it must be said that in 
most cases the various types of properties were treated separately, sometimes 
also by separate norms. The most common distinction made by the legislators 
  
 61 For instance, while writing about Maori restitution, Barkan notes that the Maoris 
count for about 13% of the population; Barkan, E.: The guilt of nations: restitution and 
negotiating historical injustices. New York, N. Y. 2000. 167. 
 62 Verdery: op. cit. 91–92, quoting Humphrey, C.: Marx Went Away but Karl Stayed 
Behind. Ann Arbor, MI, 1998. 
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was the one between agricultural properties (and forestry) and buildings, thus 
between different kinds of real property. This separation usually meant also a 
difference in treatment, and this in certain situations resulted in unequal outcomes 
for the former owners.  Another type of–perhaps less artificial–distinction was 
the one between movable and immovable properties, and this was quite important 
too, as post-communist reparation schemes mostly avoided to address the issue 
of movables, a question which, in turn, was more present in Holocaust restitution 
claims. Finally, a third type of problematic property-based distinction was made 
on the basis of ownership: some of the programs discern between communal 
(and various forms of communal) and individual types of holdings, while in 
every case distinction is also made between commercial and non-commercial 
properties. Distinctions made according to the certain property objects produce 
exclusion–the loss of certain objects is simply not compensated, while other 
objects lost in similar circumstances are–or, attempt to equalize the outcome of 
the process, by including different categories of property under a broader 
ceiling. 
 
Finally, in the conditions in which reparation schemes fall short from a thick 
conception of the rule of law (justice, rights or objective equality) it worth 
investigating, whether requirements of a thin reading–focusing on foreseability, 
clarity and consistency–are still met by post-communist property redistribution.  
 The European Court of Human Rights, in the Paduraru judgment has 
explained in some details the legal uncertainty that may be engendered by the 
norms’ lack of clarity and coherence. It has also noted that the great number of 
complaints filed with the Romanian courts for the return of properties or for 
the annulment of purchase contracts is exactly the product of this uncertainty, 
while the judges required to decide these cases lack a sufficiently predictable and 
coherent legal ground. The Court has also noted that diverging outcomes are 
inherent in adjudication, but the role of the supreme judicial body would be 
exactly to solve such contradictions in the case law (and pointed towards to 
Romanian highest instance’s indecision on controversial questions of law). 
Absent a mechanism that ensures coherence in adjudication, persistent and 
profound divergences in questions of great social interest can lead to the 
engendering of a permanent uncertainty and a loss of confidence in the 
judiciary, a fundamental component of “l’Etat de droit”.63  
 Accordingly, even at its most minimalist interpretation, the rule of law 
must mean the rule of regular and foreseeable law, which, in a perhaps over-
  
 63 Paduraru c. Roumanie, CEDH, Requête no 63252/00, Arrêt de 1 decembre 2005, para. 
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optimistic reading may eventually amount to procedural fairness. Unfortunately 
at least under three aspects–valuation, time limits and probation–the reparation 
schemes’ provisions are not beyond criticism. 
 The practice of leaving the establishment of the concrete form and extent of 
the compensation to be received up to further governmental regulations was 
found unconstitutional in Lithuania64 (for breaching rule of law requirements 
such as clarity, certainty, security and protection of legitimate expectations), but 
was left unchallenged in Romania. In Hungary, the Constitutional Court found 
acceptable the government’s reluctance to fulfill international obligations relating 
to compensation, holding that the common solution given by the Compensation 
law shall be applicable also to those whose original entitlement arose from 
international agreements.65 
 Deadlines for filing claims to reparation proved unrealistically short, and 
even in those cases in which they were not challenged in court, they were 
subsequently prolonged–even repeatedly–to make it possible for more applicants 
to benefit from the project. In Czechia for instance, the Constitutional Court 
found the shortness of the deadline as an effective barrier for the applicants in 
pursuing their rights,66 while in Slovakia similar claims were dismissed on the 
grounds of that special circumstances justify special treatment.67 The length 
of the reparation proceedings was also problematic. The Lithuanian Supreme 
Court found a breach of the right to effective remedy,68 the Estonian Supreme 
Court spoke about the violation of the requirement of legal clarity,69 while the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court discovered an unconstitutional omission in 
cases in which the authorities failed to react in reasonable time.70   
 Evidence-related problems have arisen either in combination with the short-
ness of deadlines (in Hungary, for e.g. it was possible to complete the submitted 
application even after the deadline has passed, but in Slovakia failure to comply 
with legal requirements was considered to result in the lapse of the claim), or 
due to the authorities refusal to allow access certain sites or documents. Further, 
certain forms of evidence, such as witness testimonies were not allowed in 
the majority of the analyzed cases. In Poland, for example, a witness-related 
requirement that in practice precluded anybody younger than 78 years of age 
  
 64 LiCC, case no. 19/02, Ruling of 23 August 2005. 
 65 For e.g. see: HCC, AB 16/1993, 1378/E/1990. 
 66 CCC, Pl. US 3/94, Judgement of 1 November, 1994. 
 67 SCC, Pl. US 3/00 of 24 April, 2001. 
 68 LiSC, Ruling of 22 May 2000. 
 69 ESC, Case no. 3-4-1-5-02, Decision of 28 October 2002. 
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from deposing in the favor of the applicants, was found to be at odds with the 
principle of the rule of law.71 However, a Romanian provision that required 
depositions to be made by all the owners (or their heirs) of the plots surrounding 
the claimed land remained unchallenged. Conclusively, in many situations it 
was up to the constitutional courts to come to the former owners’ rescue and 
clarify problematic provisions. While in some cases the constitutional courts 
came to the individuals’ rescue by striking down some of the problematic legal 
provisions, or court decisions, in other cases they remained deferential, and 
upheld the legislative arrangements, and in the third instance, some of the 
problematic provisions passed unchallenged. Still, a massive involvement of 
constitutional courts in the reparation process is problematic in itself. As Sadurski 
notes, strong judicial review system may send a negative message, obscuring 
the rights discourse and lifting it from public discourse (deliberation) to the 
small, specialized world of constitutional experts. And this aspect is considered 
to be at least as important, as the undeniable gains–visible in reparations 
perspective from the above analysis–of having the legislation monitored by 
specialized guardians.72 
 
The post-communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe had two main 
options in entrenching a new political elite resulting from a combination of the 
old nomenclature and the leaders of the democratic opposition movements, 
which was experiencing a pressing need for legitimacy after the fall of the 
totalitarian rule. One was the political option, consisting in demonstrating 
allegiance towards democratic values and institutions–to the rule of law. Other 
was the economic option, the creation of a market economy that carried the 
promise of a well-being characteristic of the much envied capitalist societies.  
 Unfortunately, the solution chosen was arguably the worst one, as transition 
governments attempted to achieve both options in the same time, under the 
false impression that the two totally distinct goals may legitimate and support 
each other. As this paper argues, it is theoretically untenable to pursue an even 
(or close to even) distribution of property in the name of reparatory justice on 
the basis of the argument that this would facilitate better the emergence of a 
market economy. It is equally wrong to talk about the role of privately owned 
property in a market economy, as an argument that justifies mitigation of past 
property injustices.  
  
 71 PCT, K 2/04, Judgement of 15 December 2004. 
 72 Sadurski, W.: Rights Before Courts. A study of Constitutional Courts in Post-
communist States of Central and Eastern Europe. New York, N. Y. 2005. 298–299. 
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 The complexity of tasks that transition societies had to face is obvious and 
uncontested. Czarnota, Krygier and Sadurski wrote in this context about the 
burden that has fallen upon “institutions of justice”, in the attempt to conceal 
the competing interests and expectations, a process, which resulted in a trans-
formation of “expectations and the realities on which they are based.”73 This 
view echoes to a certain degree Teitel’s argument on the role of law during 
transitions. Accordingly, during transition periods, rule of law ideals are appli-
cable only with significant amendments, generated by the tumultuous context 
of the transformation process. Transitional law, according to Teitel, is a sui 
generis paradigm, a vehicle of social, political and ideological transformation.74  
 The analysis of the various property reparation processes across Central 
and Easter Europe, however, create and uneasy feeling towards the above-
delineated conception of the transitional rule of law. For as it was argued, 
property reparations pursued a number of goals and not all of them were 
targeting the greatest benefit of the people. A redrafting of power structures 
was taking place, a struggle between the elites, which defined to some extent 
the context of transition, and thus, implicitly, the rule of law ideals, as Teitel 
correctly noted. Obviously, law had to be responsive to these circumstances 
of the political change.75 Albeit the question that arises is whether one may 
accept all the outcomes–the distinctions made by reparation schemes, the 
exclusion of certain groups (of former owners and of types of properties) from 
the benefits of the program–under the argument that “it is what the law does 
and it is the reason why law does it”?76 Is perpetuation of old (and creation of 
new) injustices justifiable by the sui generis nature of transition? 
 The answer to these questions, in the light of problems analyzed in this 
paper must be a categorical no. Regardless, how specific the circumstances 
of transition from authoritarianism to democracy are, regardless of the 
transitional tasks of the rule of law, a core, a minimum of the ideal must be 
recognized as invariably surviving in any kind of regime context (transitional 
or not), for otherwise there would not be much left to talk about. This–on the 
footsteps of Krygier–I take it to be the protection against arbitrary exercise 
of power.77 Arbitrary, in property reparations context equates with unjustified 
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distinctions in the treatment of those placed in an equal situation. Whereas 
unjustified stands for the lack of any convincing argument that may explain how 
the envisaged scheme does contribute to a better furtherance of the multiple 
goals that it proposed to achieve. As it was argued, economic reform and 
mitigation of past injustices are goals, which can not explain and justify each 
other.  
 The amendments to the rule of law ideal, justifiable in the context of transition 
can go as far as–for example–to allow governments to decide upon the concrete 
form of the reparation, the type of wrongs it want to address, the period in time 
intended to be covered. As it was shown in this paper, there are clear-cut 
guidelines neither in international law nor in legal theory that may shed enough 
light on these matters. But they may not create winners and losers; they may 
not distinguish between those placed in the same situation. For transition may 
come to an end, but the injustices that it entrenched will perpetuate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
